The mi cro processing revolution prom ises to usher in the full y co mputerized "office of the future," raising troubling questions about the rights of clerical workers and the meaning of work. . ..... p. 12
Newly released working papers are announced . . p. 15
In this century, poets have wondered whether the world will end in fire or ice, in a bang or a whimper. But in the almost four decades since the first atomic bomb was detonated over Hiroshima, eschatological questions have no longer seemed the poet's special province. Fears of global nuclear holocaust have occupied millions of ordinary human beings who, though more or less resigned to living w ith the bomb, remain determined not to die by it.
These fears are now particularly intense. Antinuclear rallies proliferate in Europe to match the proliferation of nuclear warheads positioned there. Referendums calling for a bilateral freeze on the development of new nuclear weapons have appeared on local ballots across the country, and have met with an enthusiastic response. A full conference of the U.S. Catholic Bishops last May approved a highly publicized pastoral letter expressing grave reservations about the moral legitimacy of current u.s. deterrence strategies .
And tens of thousands of demonstrators in Greenham Common, England, have formed a human chain around a proposed Trident nuclear warhead site, resolved to resist Armageddon.
No goal could be more widely shared than the goal of having human life on earth continue and flourish, of not destroying human life or-perhaps even worsealtering it beyond recognition . Do the over 17, 000 nuclear warheads the superpowers currentl y point at each other place human life as we know it in peril? It is a commonplace to observe that each side possesses ample nuclear capability to destroy the other side many
Report from the Center for times over. Those who build and deploy these massive arsenals main tain, however, that, unlike all previous weapons known to man, nuclear weapons, precisely because of their terrifying destructive potential, exist not to be used, but to dele/' their ever being used. They serve the ends of peace, not of war, by making nuclear war too terrible to contemplate.
Philosopher George Sher of the University of Vermont find s these claims about the deterrent role of nuclear weapons radicall y perplexing : "A ny policy which is seriously thought necessary to maintain peace, yet which may end by extinguishing all human life, must raise moral perplexities on an unprecedented scale." Certainly our current deterrence policies raise a battery of urgent moral questions. The latter, COlln leliorce strategy embod ies the longstanding military tradition that, in the words of University of Maryland political scientist George Quester, " To attack the enemy of the same cut of uniform is fair game . To bomb civilians is not .... The most honorable note of military training anywhere is that the only legitimate target will be people in uniform on the other side. " Civilian immunity is a cornerstone of just war theory, which condemns waging war against the " innocent. "
In the nuclear age, however, coll niemallle strategy has come into its own. In the early years of nuclear weapons design, indeed, targeting technology was insufficiently developed to permit aiming at specific military installations. Accuracy extended only to targeting enemy cities, raising the specter of the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians. Deterrence theorists have turned this very crudeness of nucl ea r weapons to advantage in justifying their existence, however. Unsuited for waging and w inn ing a war, these new and terrible weapons were suited instead for ensuring that such a war would never be foug ht. Counterforce strategy, these theorists claim, however humane it might sound, is actually far more dangerous, for it destabilizes the fragile peace that countervalue strategy ca n preserve.
Quester explains: "When either sid e has the ability to disarm the other's military, it will be tempted to do so, lest it lose this ability later on, lest the other side attain it afterward. . . Victory may simpl y go to whoever strikes first, with a result that each side will race to strike in cris is, shooting first and ask ing ques- Countervalue strategy raises the stakes of war by ensuring that everyone, including any side that gambles on starting a war, will lose utterly. This approach of " Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) is argued to be a powerful peace-keeper. Strategies like MAD escalate the magnitude of the possible horror, but seek above all to deter it. On the traditional counterforce strategy, the horror is less horrible, but considerably more likely to befall. Since the consequences of nuclear war in either case will be horrible enough, and only dubiously contained, it may be most important that the war not begin. As George Sher notes, " The consequences of nuclear war will count against deterrence only if that policy runs an appreciable risk of failure . . .. If there is no appreciable risk of failure, then the consequences of failure become irrelevant. " In the final analysiS, it seems, what counts is whether deterrence works.
Military Expenditures and Foreign Economic Aid of the Developed Countries

Does Deterrence Work?
What does it mean for deterrence to work? McGeorge Bundy, advisor on major elements of u .S. foreign policy over the past twenty years, remarks that in one sense our deterrent policies have obviously worked: there has been no nuclear war. In the same sense, he reminds us, the deterrent policies of Finland, Austria, Canada, and Mexico have worked as well. These nations also have a concept of deterrence, /' a view of what is necessary to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them. " And these nations can equally well claim on behalf of their policies that" there has been no war against them, and no coercion that has prevented their citizens from living lives decisively betReport [rom t h e Center [or ter than those of the generation before them ." Clearly, Bundy says, "the judgment that deterrence has worked is not a judgment that any particular form of deterrence was the best available-or even that it was necessary.
. It is only an assumption, and one not open to proof, that the nuclear weapon [is] indispensable to [deterrence] ."
These considerations imply that other policy elements may work to deter as much as the balance of terror does-or perhaps more. Bundy suggests that detente itself may be IJ a reinforcement to deterrence, in the sense that clear agreements can be more stable, more reliable, more costly to challenge, and more reassuring than ten s ion cau s ed by open disagreement. "
Such considerations also imply that the vast economic costs of the MAD strategy are not unimportant in its assessment. When no one can enlpirically prove or disprove that a massive arsenal effectively safeguards peace, it is not clear how many additional trillions of dollars should be earmarked for the military. But Bundy, for one, thinks that " prudent modernization" should suffice to maintain a credible deterrent, so the monetary costs of deterrence perhaps need not be as staggering as Pentagon estimates might suggest.
Mutual Assured Destruction carries with it moral as well as economic costs, however, and some have argued that these may be great enough to count deCisively against MAD, whether 01 110t it works. Some means may be flatly ruled out as morally unacceptable, even if they are necessary to achieve important ends. We ordinarily don't believe that "It works" gives a full answer to the question, " Is it morally acceptable?" Of course, most ends are not as vital as deterring nuclear war. What moral reasons tell against MAD, and how much weight should we give them? "The jlldgml'l1t that dcterrl'lI cc has worked i' 1101 a iJlt(~I1/{Jllt that ally particlilar f( lnll of de lelTell CC It '15 the best available-or eUi'1I that If rutlS 11{'(t'S5my.
If is wily nil assumptioll , GIld olle /lot UP!?" 10 proof,
tltnt the IIl1d{'ar weapon is jlU/iSl't llsllb/e to dctern'l/l"l'. "
Intentions, Innocence, and Immunity
The original objection to MAD was that targeting nuclear warheads against cities violates the principle of civilian immunity. To this it was replied that MAD is not a strategy for fighting a nuclear w ar, but for deterring a nuclear war, and so the carnage that could result if a war were fought on this strategy need not count against it.
It is true, nonetheless, that the warheads are in fact pointed at civilian populations and that each nation has threatened to launch them if attacked. Our leaders · '
I I
Report from the Center tor even now declare their firm intention to launch such a retaliatory assault, knowing full well the resultant slaughter. Suppose we believe that it is always wrong to kill the innocent, and that the ordinary citizens of any country are by and large innocent of any acts of war. Is it any less wrong to intend to kill them than to commit the killing itself?
Gregory Kavka, philosopher at the University of California at Irvine, explains our usual reasoning for thinking it is not. "We regard the man who fully intends to perform a wrongful act and is prevented from doing so solely by external circumstances (e.g., a man whose murder plan is interrupted by the victim's heart attack) as being just as bad as the man who performs supposed immunity of innocent civilians. Generally we believe that " persons have moral immunity, and it is impermissible to deliberately impose significant harm or risk on them, unless they are themselves morally responsible for creating relevant harms or dangers." But the degree of moral responsibility necessary to annul this immunity may be construed more or less strictly in different situations. "O ur beliefs about dangerous situations are complex enough, ' I according to Kavka, "to take account of the fact that there are various kinds of connections an individual may have to a given danger, and that these may hold in various combinations and degrees.. . When there is a significant present danger, and control of that danger requires Protestors in Greenham Common, England, form a chain for peace. a like wrongful act." (Kavka notes that the principle also holds if I intend to kill my neighbor if he insults me and fail to kill him only because he happens' to refrain from insult.) We tend to treat the intention to perform an act as the beginning of the act itself.
However, Kavka rejects the principle that if an act is wrong, intending to perform it is also wrong. The principle fails precisely when applied to deterrent intentions, to " intentions adopted solely to prevent the occurrence of the circumstances in which the intention would be acted upon." In the u sual case, an agent forms an intention to do something because he or she desires to do that thing, and thus the moral evaluation of intention and act are fused. But in the case of deterrent intentions, the intention is formed independently of any desire to carry out the act intended and is indeed compatible with desiring nol to carry it out. The intentions driving the MAD strategy, Kavka concludes, may be evaluated 'On their own merits.
Furthermore, Kavka casts doubt more broadly on the 4 loosening the conditions of liability, our inclination is to regard some loosenings as justified." Thus, we feel more justified in stopping a knifewielding madman by shooting him than in achieving the same result by shooting an uninvolved third party, although the madman is not strictly responSible for what he does. Or, Kavka suggests, compare deterring country Y from attacking by threatening retaliation against its cities, with deterring it by threatening retaliation against the cities of uninvolved nation Z. In the case of collective action by an organized group, individual contributions are typically indirect and inSignificant, and to insist on a tight causal connection to establish responSibility "would be to let too many people (in some cases perhaps everyone) off the hook, and largely lose the ability to influence group acts by deterrence,"
Finally, we may not want to accept the moral prohibition against killing the innocent in its most absolute form. Even those who believe that certain acts Lewis points to the radical uncertainty under which generals and soldiers of all ranks would be groping toward a decision . " It might indeed be true, if deterrence failed, that our retaliation would accomplish no good purpose, would accomplish nothing but dreadful and off-target ve ngeance. It might also be false. What is preposterous. . is to imagine that anyone could k now th at there was nothin g left but vengeance .... I say that it might well be right to launch the counterattack : instrumentally rational and morally right, all things considered. As ri ght, that is, as any choice could be in so desperate and tragic a predicament. II It might, of course, be wrong. Retaliation ntight do nothing more than to complete the devastation already begun, gratuitously incinerating additional millions and rendering huge portions of the earth unfit for human life-if the extensive genetic damage that would also be wreaked did not preclude the possibility of future generations' enjoying anything that could be called " human" life. And it wo uld be wrong, on Lewis's account, for our strategists to intend to launch a counterattack massive beyond any military necessity, massive beyond an y consideration of what could possibly be right.
Wrong, and pointless . For Lewis believes that " no such intentions are necessary to provide deterrence .
The intention to launch a counterattack only if, and only to the extent that, it is right provides deterrence galore .... The sort of counterattack that might serve a good purpose would be a dreadful retaliation as well."
We need not worry that anything less than the vastest devastation imaginable will not be sufficientl y terrifying. In a world such as ours, with arsenals such as ours, there is no shortage of fear, just a shortage of hope .
